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Frasure: Italy at the Paris Peace Conference
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
the instructor would be at a loss to determine where to draw the
line on duplication and where the "definitive and complete course"
should begin and end.
LEO CARUN.
College of Law,
Morgantown, West Virginia.
By Ren6 Albrecht
Carri6. New York, N. Y. Columbia University Press, 1938. Pp.
xv, 575, maps.
ITALY AT THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE.

This volume is one of a series, THE

PARIS PEACE CONFEmRENCE:

HISTORY ANiD DOCUMENTS, that is being published by the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace. Although the great detail
with which this volume is written makes it of primary interest to
the scholar the work cannot be ignored by anyone who is attempting to understand the present confused relations of Italy, Germany,
France, and Great Britain. Italian foreign policy for nearly twenty years has been largely determined by the failure of Italy to get
from the Versailles Peace Conference and succeeding treaties what
she felt rightly belonged to her both as a result of the provisions
of the Treaty of London of 1915 and the fact that Italy came out of
the war as one of the victorious states.
This book is divided into four parts. The first deals briefly
with the war and Italy's entrance in 1915; the second covers the
period of the Orlando-Sonnino Ministry from November 1918 to
June 1919; the third treats the Nitti Ministry from June 1919 to
June 1920; and the fourth gives us the final settlement, as it
affected Italy, both on the continent and in Africa.
For the first time since the Versailles Conference Italy's case is
here set forth to the world. There was nothing natural in Italy's alliance with Austria-Hungary except her desire to counteract French
influence in northern Africa and she did not enter the war on the
side of the central powers in 1914 primarily because she had little
to gain even in victory. Strict neutrality was the best policy until
the Allies made an attractive offer for her services, an offer which
promised much more for Italy than the Central Powers had to give.
Under these circumstances Italy, as an opportunist, joined the
Allies in 1915 under the provisions of the "secret" Treaty of London. Before the end of the war Woodrow Wilson announced his
Fourteen Points which were later accepted as a basis for peace and
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Italy quickly realized that the terms of the Treaty of London and
the Fourteen Points could not be reconciled. About the same time
Great Britain and France began to feel that Italy's price in 1915
had been too high and they saw in Wilson's program an outlet for
their own "rash" action in agreeing to Italy's demand at the time
when they needed her services against Austria-Hungary. In consequence Italy soon found herself standing alone in her strictly national policy against the ideal of internationalism sponsored by
Wilson, and backed by George and Clemenceau whenever Italy
mentioned her claims under the Treaty of London. As the author
so clearly brings out Italy was at once cast in the role of defender
of the Old Order in Europe against the New Order as exemplified
by the principle of self-determination of peoples. The spoils system in making peace had presumably given way to a more humanitarian policy.
But Wilson with his idealism was only one obstacle in the way
of Italy's claims, even though the most effective. The author is
very critical of the policies of both Orlando and Sonnino, the leaders of the Italian delegation. According to him they weakened
Italy's case through failure to insist more strongly upon the provisions of the London Treaty. In addition political differences and
jealousies of members of the Italian Government further aggravated
Italy's position at the Conference. The latter situation in part
came about because of the failure of the Italian representatives at
Versailles to overcome the opposition of Wilson to their claims, but
it is difficult to see how any one could have done better than Orlando and Sonnino when we realize that Wilson had the support of
both George and Clemenceau against Italy. To the author, Woodrow Wilson was the main cause of the embarrassing position that
Italy found herself in at Versailles and Italy rejoiced at Wilson's
defeat in the 1920 elections. In the Treaty of Rapallo, which followed almost immediately, Italy obtained through direct negotiations with Jugoslavia more than she was able to get from the
Allies at Versailles. But it was too late for Italy to obtain what
she considered a fair share of ex-enemy possessions in the Near
East and in Africa.
If Italy represented the Old Order at the Versailles Conference her action was only in keeping with her agreement with
Great Britain and France in 1915. Even though the price of
Italy's assistance to the Allies may have been too high the Allies
were willing to pay it when military necessity seemed to demand
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that they do so. Yet when circumstances permitted they were not
unwilling to hide behind Woodrow Wilson's coat tails in denying
that the Treaty of London was any longer applicable. This book
will do much to help place Italian policy at the Versailles Conference in its true light. In doing so it will also shed some new
light upon Allied policy and will aid in explaining the strained
relations between Italy and Great Britain and France since that
time. Even though the recent Munich Pact was not an Italian victory in any sense Mussolini must have received some pleasure out
of the fact that Great Britain and France found themselves in an
awkward position before Hitler and were compelled to accept a
loser's terms.
An important feature of this volume is the more than two
hundred pages of pertinent documents covering the period from
1915 to 1919. There are also an adequate bibliography and an excellent index.
CARL M. FRAsuRE.
West Virginia University,
Morgantown, West Virginia.

TRADE AssocIATIoNs

IN LAW AND

Kirsh and Harold Roland Shapiro.
Company, 1938. Pp. 399.

BusrNss. By Benjamin S.
New York.

Central Book

In 1912, one year after the Supreme Court distilled the "rule
of reason" out of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, A. J. Eddy
presented a forceful apologia for "cooperative competition,' a
term used to describe the trade association device which he sponsored. This year another apologia has appeared in print. Needless to say the sledding is much easier. The authors have behind
them the fruition of a long struggle in which the courts have already carved out a comfortable niche for the trade association.
The present work, however, is a theme on a variation from Eddy's.
Whereas Eddy sought to provide an impetus for an incipient trade
association movement, Messrs. Kirsch and Shapiro face a matured
system in an attempt to demarcate what is economically desirable
and legal from what is economically undesirable and illegal.
On the economic level, the tone of the book is Brandeisian. The
authors sponsor an intelligent cooperation on the part of competitors, a cooperation which offers the advantages of large scale
1 EDDY,

THE NEw Co fPrriTION (1912).
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